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Summary 
What is the nature of the neural code by which the human brain represents spoken language? New 
research suggests that previous findings of a language-specific code in cortical responses to speech 
can be explained solely by simple acoustic features. 
Main text 
As anyone who has been repeatedly misunderstood by their phone’s virtual assistant can testify, the 
human brain remains the best speech recognition device out there. During a rush-hour commute in 
any capital city, we might hear speech produced with twenty different accents (both regional and 
international).  At the same time (at least in the case of those braving the city’s metro system), we 
might also hear the loud screech of a train amplified by tunnel walls. In environments like these, 
machine speech recognition software would most probably fail. And yet most of the time, we as 
human listeners have no problems understanding the speech that we hear. A new study by Daube 
et al. [1], reported in this issue of Current Biology, provides new evidence of the neural 
representations by which the brain makes sense of spoken language. 
To fully understand speech, the brain has to recognize words from a rapidly changing sound wave. 
According to one proposal [2], words are recognized by comparing the heard speech signal with an 
internal memory of what words should sound like (termed the ‘lexicon’). A word will be recognized if 
there is a good match between its entry in the listener’s lexicon and the heard speech signal. By this 
account, the acoustics of speech are mapped directly onto the lexicon without any intervening 
steps. However, in most other cognitive [3] and neuroscientific [4] theories, an intermediate stage is 
proposed whereby each spoken word is categorized into discrete units such as phonemes. The 
hallmark of these categorical units is that acoustic detail is stripped away from speech. Thus, 
despite substantial acoustic differences, a “t” phoneme is categorized as a “t” whether spoken by a 
woman or a man, an adult or a child, or even when whispered. To appreciate the benefit of 
processing speech in this way, consider encountering a speaker with an unfamiliar accent such that 
they pronounced the sound “t” as “p”. Rather than learning the new pronunciation of every word 
with that sound, after hearing a few examples you might learn that “pake” is in fact “take” (and not 
“cake” or “lake” etc.). Mapping speech onto words via phonemes is therefore computationally 
efficient [5]. 
So what evidence is there that the brain represents categorical units such as phonemes during 
speech comprehension? Decades of neuroimaging and neurophysiological studies have sought to 
answer this question. A relatively recent development in this area has been to ask volunteers to 
listen to extended spoken narratives, for example story extracts, and use linear regression to test 
whether various speech features can predict recorded brain activity. Successful prediction would 
indicate that brain activity fluctuates systematically over time along with the speech features and 
therefore might represent those features. Previous research using this approach indicates that 
cortical responses to speech, as measured using electroencephalography (EEG), track which 
phoneme was heard [6]. To test whether this effect was specifically related to categorical 
phonemes, it was important to control for the fact that phonemes differ acoustically. To do this, an 
acoustic description of the speech signal – the balance of sound frequencies over time or 
‘spectrogram’ – was also regressed against the measured brain activity. The critical finding in this 
previous research then was that phonemes can indeed predict EEG signals, over and above 
acoustics. Similar results were obtained when replacing phonemes with articulatory features, which 
describe speech in terms of the underlying vocal gestures (such as the position of the tongue and 
lips). Like the phoneme, this description of the speech signal is categorical (e.g. either the lips come 
together or not e.g. when saying “b” versus “w”). These findings therefore suggest that the brain 
does indeed represents categorical-like units. 
Despite the computational efficiency of categorical representations for spoken word recognition, 
whether phonemes or articulatory features are actually represented by listeners is far from 
universally accepted [2,7]. In their new study, Daube et al. set out to test an alternative hypothesis, 
one that explains cortical responses in purely acoustic terms, thereby challenging accounts based 
on categorical representations such as phonemes (Figure 1). They first replicated the previous 
finding that articulatory features can predict brain responses over and above the audio 
spectrogram, now with magnetoencephalography (MEG) recordings localized to auditory cortex in 
the superior temporal lobe. They then used the prediction success of articulatory features as a 
benchmark against which to compare alternative acoustic-based ones, which were all obtained by 
simple transformations of the spectrogram. One such transformation emphasized acoustic onsets: 
rapid increases in spectrogram energy that are found, for example, at the start of syllables. Previous 
research indicates that the cortex is especially sensitive to such acoustic onsets [8,9]. Daube et al. 
found that these acoustic features made very similar MEG predictions to the benchmark 
articulatory features. Critically, they also found that acoustic onsets explained parts of the MEG 
response that articulatory features could not (for further explanation, see Figure 1 and caption). 
Impressively, this result was again demonstrated with publically available EEG data – the same 
dataset that provided the original evidence for phonemes and articulatory features [6]. As well as 
providing another replication, this latter finding is important as EEG can pick up activity from 
different brain regions as compared with MEG [10].  Finally, Daube et al. show how another finding 
that could be interpreted as evidence for categorical representations – the ability to decode 
phoneme groups from EEG responses  [11] – can also be attributed to acoustic onsets. Thus, cortical 
responses to speech were best explained in purely acoustic terms, using relatively simple 
computations on the spectrogram that could plausibly be realised neurally [12]. 
Recent methodological advances in non-invasive neuroimaging such as multivariate techniques 
have allowed researchers to move way from an ‘activation-based’ approach to one that more 
directly taps into content-specific representations [13,14]. With these advances it is now possible, in 
relatively naturalistic settings, to test a rich hypothesis space of how the human brain represents 
speech, including semantics [15]. The study by Daube et al. is important in highlighting the need to 
consider simple, acoustic-based features in these endeavours. It also raises several questions for 
future research. For example, Daube et al. focussed their analyses on MEG responses in the superior 
temporal lobe as these were the strongest and most reliable signals. Could signatures of 
articulatory features still be found but in higher-level regions of the cortical hierarchy? Another 
question is the extent to which other recent findings in the literature can be attributed to acoustic 
onsets, as opposed to higher-level linguistic variables? Relevant to this, it is notable that a recent 
study in this Journal did account for acoustic onsets when demonstrating cortical sensitivity to 
phonemic and lexical predictability [16]. In other work showing EEG signatures of semantic 
processing of continuous speech [15], the late latency (200-600 ms) of the neural effect of interest 
would seem to make it unlikely a reflection of low-level acoustic onsets. It is also unclear how an 
acoustic onset account can explain why phonetic tracking by EEG is dependent on speech 
intelligibility, which might suggest a language-specific (rather than auditory-general) locus [6].  
Perhaps the biggest question of all though is why the brain is sensitive to acoustic onsets and how 
this ultimately leads to successful speech comprehension. Daube et al. themselves offer one 
hypothesis: that sound onset responses are robust to background noise and thus may support 
listening in the noisy environments that we routinely encounter. Another perspective is based on 
the idea of predictive coding [17,18]. The proposal here is that rather than processing speech 
directly, the brain actively predicts upcoming sensory events so that only unexpected information 
(i.e. prediction errors) gets processed further up the cortical hierarchy. According to this view, 
cortical responses to acoustic onsets represent prediction errors that have the role of updating 
previous expectations about the short-term spectral content of sound input [19]. Whatever the 
interpretation, the insights provided by Daube et al. are undoubtedly a step towards a future in 
which we have a comprehensive account of how the brain makes sense of speech. Who knows, 
perhaps then we can explain why the brain is so much better at understanding you than your phone.  
 
 Figure 1. Daube et al. [1] tested which of several speech features was most prominently represented 
in MEG recordings of brain activity, shown here for the example word “cyclist”. The location of the 
first vowel in all feature representations is marked by a brown arrow to facilitate comparison. The 
first vowel is signalled by a transient increase in energy for both acoustic onsets and articulatory 
features. Thus, these features make the similar prediction that brain activity should change soon 
after hearing the start of the first vowel. Because of this similarity, combining acoustic onsets with 
articulatory features did not improve prediction success over acoustic onsets alone (bottom bar 
graph; compare magenta bars with and without green outline). Despite making similar predictions, 
acoustic onsets were sufficiently different from articulatory features that brain responses were 
better predicted by acoustic onsets (compare left magenta and green bars). This suggests that 
speech is neurally represented as acoustic onsets more than as articulatory features. 
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